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Imagine a future internet where service providers (ISPs) selshly price band-
width to maximize revenue and users route packets along paths that maximize
utility (value from routing minus the price paid). How eciently would such a
\bandwidth market" operate? What properties of the market or demand structure
aect the eciency of its equilibrium allocation? In this note we survey our recent
work [Chawla and Roughgarden 2008; Chawla and Niu 2009] on characterizing the
eciency of equilibria arising from price competition in such two-sided markets.
We consider revenue-maximizing sellers that own a xed inventory of a unique
item, and consumers that each buy a bundle of items to maximize utility (value
minus price). The sellers rst set item prices and consumers then buy their favorite
bundles. All parties have full information about others' values and constraints.
We call this game a Bertrand game, following the economics literature on price
competition in homogeneous product markets. Bertrand games are a natural model
for markets where prices are relatively static and non-discriminatory, and left-over
inventory can be disposed o freely.
We focus on Bertrand games in networks where each seller owns a single edge, and
each consumer is interested in buying a path from its source vertex to its sink vertex.
The eciency, or social value, of an outcome of the game is the total value obtained
by all the consumers from the bought bundles. The price of anarchy is the ratio of
the optimal eciency achievable while obeying capacity (supply) constraints to that
of the worst Nash equilibrium in the game. The price of stability is the analogous
ratio with the best Nash equilibrium in the game. These quantities are dened
with respect to pure Nash equilibria of the game. We present bounds on them that
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are valid whenever a pure Nash equilibrium exists (suciently complex instances
do not always have such an equilibrium).
1. THE PRICE OF ANARCHY WITH SINGLE-PARAMETER CONSUMERS
Consider rst a \single-parameter" setting in which each consumer values each of
their desired bundles (i.e., source-sink paths) equally.
The eect of monopolies. A simple example of a Bertrand game is a homoge-
neous product market where all items are perfect substitutes and each consumer is
interested in buying any one of the items (equivalent to a single-source single-sink
parallel-link network). This setting has been studied extensively in the economics
literature (see, for example, [Mas-Colell et al. 1995; Harrington 1989; Baye and
Morgan 1999] and references therein). It is well known, for example, that in mar-
kets with two or more sellers selling homogeneous products with equal marginal
costs, the equilibrium price charged by each seller is equal to the marginal cost
for the product. That is, the sellers make no prot and the entire social surplus
is redistributed back to the consumers. This is known as the Bertrand paradox
(see [Wikipedia ] for a discussion). Such markets always obtain optimal eciency.
On the other hand, in a market with a single seller (a monopoly), the seller can
articially restrict supply and raise prices to obtain a large prot, hurting market
eciency in the process.
Our rst set of results characterizes the eciency of equilibria in symmetric games
(i.e., where all buyers have a common source and sink) as a function of the number
of monopolies, where a monopoly is an edge belonging to every source-sink path
(i.e., a \cut edge"). Here L denotes the ratio of the largest consumer value to the
smallest.
Theorem 1.1. (informal, [Chawla and Roughgarden 2008]) In single-source single-
sink Bertrand games with no monopolies, the price of anarchy is 1. With one
monopoly, the prices of anarchy and stability can be as large as logL but no larger.
When the number of monopolies is k > 1, the price of anarchy cannot be bounded
in terms of L. The largest-possible price of stability is O(Lk 1), and this bound is
tight up to a constant factor.
Multiple sources and sinks. In more general networks, equilibria can be inecient
even in the absence of monopolies. This occurs because congestion in some parts
of the network can create \virtual" monopolies in other parts of the network. Our
second result bounds the price of anarchy in networks with multiple source vertices
in which all consumers have the same sink vertex and the distribution of consumer
values is the same at each source vertex. A key parameter turns out to be the
sparsity   1 of the network, dened as the largest fraction of the consumers that
can be routed simultaneously from every source to the sink while obeying capacities
on the links. We then have the following result relating the price of anarchy in the
Bertrand game to the sparsity of the underlying network.
Theorem 1.2. (informal, [Chawla and Niu 2009]) In every single-sink instance
of the Bertrand game that admits an equilibrium, contains no monopolies, and has
the same distribution of values at each source, the price of anarchy is no more than
1=, where  is the sparsity of the underlying network.
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The bound in this theorem is tight and all of the assumptions are necessary. In
particular, there are networks with two sources and one sink where the price of
anarchy is arbitrarily close to 1=. Furthermore, the theorem does not extend to
multiple-source multiple-sink networks.
Theorem 1.3. (informal, [Chawla and Niu 2009]) There exists a multiple-source
multiple-sink network with no monopolies such that for every \non-trivial" demand
distribution, the price of anarchy of the Bertrand game on the network is unbounded.
Value distributions with a monotone hazard rate. Our bounds improve if we im-
pose additional assumptions on the distribution of consumer values. Specically,
we study distributions satisfying the \monotone hazard rate" condition and show
that if the value distribution at every source in the network is the same and satises
this condition, then the price of anarchy is no more than ek, where k is the length of
the longest source-sink path in the network [Chawla and Niu 2009]. This condition
is common in the mechanism design literature and is satised, for example, by the
uniform, normal, exponential, power-law (for exponents greater than one), Laplace,
and chi-square distributions [Bagnoli and Bergstrom 2005].
2. GENERAL CONSUMER VALUATIONS
Finally, in [Chawla and Niu 2009] we investigate a more general version of Bertrand
games where consumers value dierent bundles at dierent amounts. In the network
setting, the dierence in values for dierent paths can arise due to dierences in,
for example, latencies, packet losses, jitter, etc. We consider two dierent models
for consumer values. In the related values model, each consumer u has an intrinsic
value `u and each path p is associated with a quality Qp. The value of consumer
u for path p is simply `u + Qp. In the unrelated values model consumer values are
arbitrary. We study these models in single-source single-sink parallel link networks.
In the absence of monopolies (dened appropriately), the behavior of the related
values model is identical to the single-parameter valuations setting: the price of
anarchy is 1. In the unrelated-values version, the behavior of the game is very
dierent. Pure equilibria need not exist. Also, even when there are no monopolies
in the network, some edges can eectively become monopolies when consumers
prefer one edge much more than the others, which can result in a large price of
anarchy. Nevertheless, we prove that the price of anarchy is always bounded above
by a factor logarithmic in L.
3. RELATED WORK
A number of recent papers, surveyed in [Ozdaglar and Srikant 2007], study the inef-
ciency of equilibria in network pricing games. Most of these works assume that the
consumer faces two kinds of costs for routing its trac|the prices charged by the
edges, and a latency cost owing to other trac on the path. In our model, by con-
trast, each edge has a hard capacity constraint rather than a congestion-dependent
cost function. While users do not face congestion costs per se in our model, service
providers are incentivized to keep usage on links below their capacities, and to pass
on the \costs" associated with oversaturated edges to consumers in the form of
higher usage prices.
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4. OPEN QUESTIONS
We provided a number of tight bounds on the price of anarchy in Bertrand games in
networks with single-parameter consumers as a function of the variation in consumer
valuations and desired bundles, the congestion in the network (i.e., the sparsity),
the shape of the demand distributions, etc. The most interesting open question
related to our work is to study equilibria in reasonably general networks when
consumers can have dierent values for dierent bundles. Another potentially in-
teresting direction is to characterize the Bertrand games that admit (pure) Nash
equilibria.
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